O envelhecimento populacional é uma preocupação mundial e exige medidas de prevenção de saúde a serem adotadas com a maior brevidade possível. Esse processo é, muitas vezes, acompanhado pelo declínio das habilidades cognitivas, como a memória e as funções executivas. O objetivo do presente estudo é ..

Typically developing 3-day-old newborns take significantly more forward steps on a moving treadmill belt than on a static belt. The current experiment examined whether projecting optic flows that specified forward motion onto the moving treadmill surface would further enhance forward stepping. Twenty newborns were supported on a moving treadmill without optic flow, with optic flow matching the treadmill’s direction and speed, with optic flow in the same direction but at a faster speed, and in a control condition with an incoherent (...) optic flow moving at the same speed as in the Congruent condition but in random directions. The results revealed no significant differences in the number or coordination of forward treadmill steps taken in each condition. However, the Faster condition generated significantly fewer leg pumping movements than the Random control condition. When highly aroused, newborns made significantly fewer single steps and significantly more parallel steps and pumping movements. We speculate the null findings may be a function of the high friction material that covered the treadmill surface. (shrink)

This paper summarizes (in German) recent tendencies in the philosophy of the life sciences.

Homeotic genes are subject to transcriptional silencing, which prevents their expression in inappropriate body regions. Here, we shall focus on Drosophila, as little is known about this process in other organisms. Evidence is accumulating that silencing of Drosophila homeotic genes is conferred by two types of cis‐regulatory sequences: initiation (SIL‐I) and maintenance (SIL‐M) elements. The former contain target sites for transient repressors with a highly localised distribution in the early embryo and the latter for constitutive repressors that are likely to (...) be present in all cells. We discuss how SIL‐I elements may cooperate with SIL‐M elements to promote formation of a silencing complex. We propose that this complex consists of specific non‐histone proteins, the so‐called Polycomb group proteins, and that it is anchored at SIL‐M elements and at the promoter. (shrink)

In the advertising discourse of human genetic database projects, of genetic ancestry tracing companies, and in popular books on anthropological genetics, what I refer to as the anthropological gene and genome appear as documents of human history, by far surpassing the written record and oral history in scope and accuracy as archives of our past. How did macromolecules become "documents of human evolutionary history"? Historically, molecular anthropology, a term introduced by Emile Zuckerkandl in 1962 to characterize the study of primate (...) phylogeny and human evolution on the molecular level, asserted its claim to the privilege of interpretation regarding hominoid, hominid, and human phylogeny and evolution vis-à-vis other historical sciences such as evolutionary biology, physical anthropology, and paleoanthropology. This process will be discussed on the basis of three key conferences on primate classification and evolution that brought together exponents of the respective fields and that were held in approximately ten-years intervals between the early 1960s and the 1980s. I show how the anthropological gene and genome gained their status as the most fundamental, clean, and direct records of historical information, and how the prioritizing of these epistemic objects was part of a complex involving the objectivity of numbers, logic, and mathematics, the objectivity of machines and instruments, and the objectivity seen to reside in the epistemic objects themselves. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the distinction between epistemic privilege and epistemic authority is an important one for feminist epistemologists who are sympathetic to feminist standpoint theory, I argue that, while the first concept is elusive, the second is really the important one for a successful feminist standpoint project.

Abstract:For many people, the media is the main source of their knowledge and understanding about policing and crime. As a result, a common thread running through content analysis of television police shows is the gap between the “reality” of police work, crime, criminals, and the justice system and the picture painted by media representations. I argue, however, that all representations of social reality are partial and that commercial imperatives, working processes, ideological frames of the makers, and format of individual shows (...) shape and constrain the stories told. Given that police shows can never be totally authentic, I argue that scholars should be exploring the symbolic value of these shows, the types of discourse produced, and whether such shows habituate viewers into ways of thinking about crime and punishment that may be excessively simplified. (shrink)

From the 1960s, mathematical and computational tools have been developed to arrive at human population trees from various kinds of serological and molecular data. Focusing on the work of the Italian-born population geneticist Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, I follow the practices of tree-building and mapping from the early blood-group studies to the current genetic admixture research. I argue that the visual language of the tree is paralleled in the narrative of the human diasporas, and I show how the tree was actually (...) mapped onto the surface of the earth. This visual and textual structure is mirrored in the liberal discourse of unity in diversity that has been criticized as running counter to the socio-political effects of human population genetics. From this perspective, one may ask how far the phylogenetic diagram in its various forms is a manifestation of the physics of power that according to Michel Foucault consists in mechanisms that analyse distributions, movements, series, combinations, and that uses instruments to render visible, to register, to differentiate and to compare. It is one among other disciplinary technologies that ensure the ordering of human diversity. In the case of intra-human phylogenetic trees, population samples and labels are one issue. Another is that the separated branches seem to show groups of people, who have in reality been interacting and converging, as isolated. Often based on so-called isolated peoples, molecular tree diagrams freeze a hierarchical kinship system that is meant to represent a state before the great historical population movements. (shrink)

Addiction is a common condition affecting millions of people worldwide of which only a small proportion receives treatment. The development and use of healthcare services is influenced by how addiction is understood (e.g., a condition to treat, a shameful condition to stigmatize), notably with respect to how volition is impacted (e.g., addiction as a choice or a disease beyond one’s control). Through semi-structured qualitative interviews, we explore the implicit views and understandings of addiction and volition across three stakeholder groups: people (...) with lived experience of addiction, clinicians with experience treating addiction, and members of the public without lived experience of addiction. We notably examine whether three paradigms, i.e., three philosophical sets of understandings about the nature of reality and knowledge (realism, relativism, pragmatism) reflect how stakeholders envision addiction and volition in the context of addiction. The use of these paradigms allows for the characterization of different stances on addiction and volition and an assessment of the coherence of beliefs about these matters. Our findings demonstrate that few participants relied on a single epistemic paradigm when describing their views. Furthermore, there were notable differences in understandings of volition between the clinician group, who were more oriented toward pragmatism, and people with lived experience of addiction, who were less oriented toward realism. Despite its limitations, our study suggests that a greater appreciation for the complexity of views held by different stakeholders about addiction and volition could help critically assess the search for coherence expressed in academic and policy debates. (shrink)

Between the last decades of the 18th century and the middle of the 19th century, something of paramount importance happened in the history of anthropology. This was the advent of a physical anthropology that was about the classification of ‘human races’ through comparative measurement. A central tool of the new trade was diagrams. Being inherently about relations in and between objects, diagrams became the means of defining human groups and their relations to each other – the last point being disputed (...) between the monogenists and the polygenists. James Cowles Prichard, a proponent of the comparative historical approach, was able to do without images in his pioneering Researches Into the Physical History of Man of 1813, but the third edition, which appeared in five volumes between 1836 and 1847, was richly illustrated with ‘ethnic types’ and skulls, including diagrams. What was happening is a process I engage with in detail for Samuel George Morton, who collected and distributed human skulls as lithographs in Crania americana (1839) and Crania aegyptiaca (1844). Along with the paper skulls travelled detailed instructions of how to look at them through a set of lines and to set their individual parts in relation to each other as well as to those of other types. Drawing on Johann Friedrich Blumenbach and Peter Camper, the Crania thus played a pivotal role in establishing what I call a diagrammatics of race – a diagrammatics that became overtly political with Types of Mankind (1854), which was written in Morton's honour by Josiah Nott and George Gliddon. (shrink)

This paper discusses the definition of argumentation as a means for persuading an audience on the acceptability of a thesis. It is argued that persuasion is a goal that relates more to the communicative situation, the type of interaction or the type of discourse, rather than to the argumentative nature of it. Departing from the analysis of a short conversational sequence between people who agree on an issue and nevertheless argue, I suggest that a definition of argumentation in terms of (...) persuasion fails to account for what people are actually doing in these situations. I propose instead that several functions may be assigned to argumentation when considering the context in which it is produced: a cognitive function (which helps participants to elaborate a position on the discussed issue), and an identifying function (which enables them to portray themselves through the expression and the justification of their opinion). In the case analyzed here, a third function to which the argumentative activity contributes can also be identified, namely the enhancing of the emotional tonality of the relationship between the participants. While it becomes clear from the discussion of this argumentative sequence that the participants do not seek to persuade each other or some third party, it is not suggested that argumentation never aims at persuading an audience, but rather that persuasion cannot be considered as a defining feature of argumentation. (shrink)

In this article, I am concerned with the public engagements of Julian Huxley, Lancelot Hogben, and J. B. S. Haldane. I analyze how they used the new insights into the genetics of heredity to argue against any biological foundations for antidemocratic ideologies, be it Nazism, Stalinism, or the British laissez-faire and class system. The most striking fact—considering the abuse of biological knowledge they contested—is that these biologists presented genetics itself as inherently democratic. Arguing from genetics, they developed an understanding of (...) diversity that cuts across divisions of race, class, or gender. Human diversity rightly understood was advantageous for societal progress. Huxley, Hogben, and Haldane did not hold identical political ideals, but they all argued for democratic reforms and increased planning geared toward greater social equality, and they did so under the label of scientific humanism. Huxley took issue with the notion that evolutionary history does not carry any moral lessons for human societies. Rather than being its antithesis, evolution was the basis of human sociality. In fact, the entire future progress of individuals and communities toward a democratic world order needed to be founded on the cosmic principles of evolution—a process that had to be guided by the biological expert with a strong sense of social responsibility. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the distinction between epistemic privilege and epistemic authority is an important one for feminist epistemologists who are sympathetic to feminist standpoint theory, I argue that, while the first concept is elusive, the second is really the important one for a successful feminist standpoint project.

Anthropologists have tended to treat dreams as private fantasies arising from restless libidos struggling with reality. In this view, the dreamer is a victim of what she or he does not want, the intentions of the dreamer, and dreamed of, are often confused or illusory, and what happens in the dream is subj ect to a more primary, more objective, waking reality.The Barok people of New Ireland, Papua New Guinea, define dreams as both sleeping and waking experiences. Their dreams are (...) expressions of spiritually powerful persons who deal with a spiritual reality.In waking and real, but substantially dreamlike experiences such as one I describe in this paper, the desires and intents of all involved were perceived as wild possibilities. In the three sleeping dreams that I describe, the desires and intents of the dreamers were true, clearly expressed, and effective in creating or foretelling reality.Describing such subjective and willful experiences entails personal and professional risk. But toward understanding what happened, I undertake this in personally revealing terms, and I recommend Barok and other Native perspectives for the light they shed on dreams and reality.Social science has, for the most part, left dream analysis to the psychologists, and dreaming experiences to "the natives.” People educated in modern European traditions, and especially in academe, learn to not talk plainly or too much about their more subjective experiences or awarenesses, e.g, sex, emotions, and dreams. This applies not only to our lives as fieldworkers, but to our private lives in Western culture.Even recent publications1 still define dreams as a softer and more subjective, or even false, too private, in contrast to the harder and more objective, true reality of waking life (see Tedlock 1987). From this perspective, the accepted truth of there being an objective, socially defined, wakeful reality is not seriously called into question.Fieldwork experiences have shown me different distinctions between dreaming and not‐dreaming realities. I have learned to both expect and get more from dreams. I did not seek nor intentionally precipitate these experiences. They were a congruent part of my learning during four different periods of fieldwork.These experiences suggest a link between the ambiguity of intent in western style, non‐Native2 dreamers, and a lack of creative power. This contrasts with the clarity in the intent of Native style dreamers, and a real creative power.This link short‐circuits conventional academic distinctions between dreaming and waking experiences. For this reason, people like myself have not paid attention to these kinds of field experiences, much less written them up. We fear being disbelieved and discredited. Treating dreams on a comparable footing with objective reality is tantamount to "going native.”3 As Katherine Ewing has stated it, the problem is how to believe the Native meaning of dreams in defiance of the taboo against anthropologists' accepting the "temptation to believe" that "the subjects of one's research actually know something about the human condition and an encompassing 'reality'"(Ewing 1994:572).The field experiences I describe here have made me a believer of both the Native version of what happened, and the truth of there being an encompassing (Native) reality.4 They also convinced me of the necessity of trying to deal openly with what I know of the internal, private, libidinous, and willful stuff that is a part of these dreaming experiences. I reveal my own intent, desires, and needs, in both personal and professional terms, in order to lay some of the cards on the table, in order to look at them from both Native and non‐Native perspectives on what happened.I have learned that the difference between dreams and reality is not what it has been made out to be. On the one hand, the conventional definition of reality too strongly limits my ability to talk about my subjective experiences of it. On the other hand, the conventional definition of dreams does not make enough sense of my real experiences.By describing the real, non‐dreaming experience in which my subjective feelings are centered, the problematic issues of my own wakeful intent as a person and as an anthropologist are centered. This allows comparison of what is supposedly the nature of waking reality with what I experienced in the three sleeping dreams (hereafter "sleepdreams") which follow.The first three sleepdreams were experienced when I was living among Barok people at New Ireland, PNG, between 1979 and 1985. The fourth occured at Taumako, Solomon Islands, in 1993. (shrink)

During the first decades of the 20th century, many anthropologists who had previously adhered to a linear view of human evolution, from an ape via Pithecanthropus erectus and Neanderthal to modern humans, began to change their outlook. A shift towards a branching model of human evolution began to take hold. Among the scientific factors motivating this trend was the insight that mammalian evolution in general was best represented by a branching tree, rather than by a straight line, and that several (...) new fossil hominids were discovered that differed significantly in their morphology but seemed to date from about the same period. The ideological and practical implications of imperialism and WWI have also been identified as formative of the new evolutionary scenarios in which racial conflict played a crucial role. The paper will illustrate this general shift in anthropological theory for one particular scientist, William Sollas. Sollas achieved a synthesis of human morphological and cultural evolution in what I will refer to as an imperialist model. In this theoretical framework, migration, conflict, and replacement became the main mechanisms for progress spurred by 'nature's tyrant,' natural selection. (shrink)

We work in set-theory without choice ZF. A set is Countable if it is finite or equipotent with ${\Bbb N}$ . Given a closed subset F of [0, 1] I which is a bounded subset of $\ell ^{1}(I)$ (resp. such that $F\subseteq c_{0}(I)$ ), we show that the countable axiom of choice for finite sets, (resp. the countable axiom of choice AC N ) implies that F is compact. This enhances previous results where AC N (resp. the axiom of Dependent (...) Choices) was required. If I is linearly orderable (for example $I={\Bbb R}$ ), then, in ZF, the closed unit ball of the Hilbert space $\ell ^{2}(I)$ is (Loeb-)compact in the weak topology. However, the weak compactness of the closed unit ball of $\ell ^{2}(\scr{P}({\Bbb R}))$ is not provable in ZF. (shrink)

The widows of the Pastoral Epistles have been a puzzle for interpreters for generations. In the “Widows’ Tale” different categories of women are given a whole set of instructions, including how they shall be organized and with whom to live. In this article, I will highlight the interpretative potential of the very last verse of the paragraph, where “a believing woman who has widows” is mentioned. In some important manuscripts, scribes have added “believing man” in v. 16, while others have (...) left out the woman altogether. What can these disagreements and changes tell? I will argue that not enough scholarly attention has been directed to this verse. There is huge potential for a new understanding of the whole paragraph hidden here. Attention to alternative housing arrangements and manuscript variations will be employed as interpretative tools. I will use the disagreement among scribes to rethink variety and difference, and to reimagine ekklēsia within intersectional early Christian households. (shrink)

In this article I will reflect on interreligious dialogue and the tensive relation between openness and identity from a theological perspective. First, I consider the so‐called theology of religions and the threefold soteriological typology of exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. Second, I address one of the main criticisms of this approach, namely that the soteriological approach amounts to a perversion of the virtue of openness. This critique is articulated especially within particularism, a model which sets out to move beyond the soteriological (...) fixation of the classical theology of religions. Because this relatively new model has not yet been analyzed systematically in the relevant literature, I will analyze some of its main tenets. I focus especially on the way this model sets out to alter the terms of the discussion on the dialogical tension between openness and commitment by claiming that hermeneutical openness should precede soteriological appreciation. Third, I turn to comparative theology as a fertile expression of particularism. Comparative theology presents itself as a genuinely adequate way to understand and appreciate the otherness of the religious other without losing sight of one's own identity. Moreover, comparative theology gives a new twist to the discussion on the dialogical tension between openness and commitment. Whereas the classical theology of religions seems to be actuated by the conviction that it is both possible and necessary to come to a final and definite soteriological appreciation of the religions, comparative theology sees interreligious encounter first and foremost as an ongoing conversational process, which can yield preliminary results only. It is my contention that this marks the nature of real and authentic dialogue. (shrink)

Why has James been relatively absent from the neopragmatist revival of the past twenty years? I argue that part of the reason is that his psychological projects seem to hold little promise for a socially and culturally progressive philosophical project, and that his concern with religious issues makes him seem like a religious apologist. Bringing together James's psychological writings with his philosophical writings shows these assumptions to be wrong. I offer a reading of “The Will to Believe” and The Principles (...) of Psychology to support my position (a) that James's philosophical methodology and his psychological works lend themselves to a naturalized approach to philosophical inquiry, which both allows for a reshaping of traditional philosophical questions and offers a check on scientism, and (b) that, contrary to many commentators' claims, James is not defending religion against science but is instead using science to address epistemic and moral issues more broadly. I conclude with a discussion of the ways in which James's naturalism demands a reconsideration of the nature of philosophical inquiry, as well as a revised view of a scientific psychology that avoids scientism. (shrink)

Although it is now generally acknowledged that new biomedical technologies often produce new definitions and sometimes even new concepts of disease, this observation is rarely used in research that anticipates potential ethical issues in emerging technologies. This article argues that it is useful to start with an analysis of implied concepts of disease when anticipating ethical issues of biomedical technologies. It shows, moreover, that it is possible to do so at an early stage, i.e. when a technology is only just (...) emerging. The specific case analysed here is that of ‘molecular medicine’. This group of emerging technologies combines a ‘cascade model’ of disease processes with a ‘personal pattern’ model of bodily functioning. Whereas the ethical implications of the first are partly familiar from earlier—albeit controversial—forms of preventive and predictive medicine, those of the second are quite novel and potentially far-reaching. (shrink)

We live in a fragmented environment where spatial information is scattered across rooms, streets, neighborhoods, and cities. To point out the direction to a currently non-visible location or to find novel shortcuts across previously untraveled terrain we need to rely on our spatial memory by piecing the experienced fragments together in our head. This thesis is concerned with the question of how our spatial memory for navigable space (also called survey knowledge) is structured. Two major theoretical approaches are contrasted. Euclidean (...) map approaches assume that spatial locations are represented in a map-like, globally embedded, Euclidean format. Enriched graph approaches propose a partitioned, unit-wise representation of places connected in a network. In four consecutive studies participants learned spatial relations between objects spread across virtual environments and solved survey tasks afterward (e.g., pointing to object locations from memory). The observed effects imply that our memory of navigable space is stored in the format of an Enriched graph, a network of local places connected by directed links, without the necessity of a global calibration. Survey estimates seem to be constructed incrementally along the memorized connectivity and are generally transient. Additionally, a general reference direction can be acquired, a main direction that is propagated across a sub-group of multiple local places (i.e., a region) or that can cover the entire environment. Taken together, our representation of navigable space seems to be best described as an impossible puzzle where the memorized pieces and connections do not necessarily match up on a global scale. (shrink)

Pancreatitis is a complex, progressively destructive inflammatory disorder. Alcohol was long thought to be the primary causative agent, but genetic contributions have been of interest since the discovery that rare PRSS1, CFTR and SPINK1 variants were associated with pancreatitis risk. We now report two associations at genome-wide significance identified and replicated at PRSS1-PRSS2 and X-linked CLDN2 through a two-stage genome-wide study. The PRSS1 variant likely affects disease susceptibility by altering expression of the primary trypsinogen gene. The CLDN2 risk allele is (...) associated with atypical localization of claudin-2 in pancreatic acinar cells. The homozygous CLDN2 genotype confers the greatest risk, and its alleles interact with alcohol consumption to amplify risk. These results could partially explain the high frequency of alcohol-related pancreatitis in men. © 2012 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

The present contribution focuses on the place of religion in the public domain and revolves around three concepts: vulnerability, recognition and tragedy. Focusing on these three notions, I will endeavour to shed some light on the complex relationship between religion and the public arena. More specifically, I will draw attention to the fact that the struggle for recognition can often lead to tragedy. There is no adequate political solution to this problem. The reason for this is that the nature of (...) the recognition religious people desire differs from that which the political system seems to be able to offer. Nevertheless, and I hope to elaborate this in what follows, an appropriate answer to this problem needs to be found, since the danger exists that the struggle for recognition might derail . It is in this perspective that I turn to religion. Whereas politics manoeuvres within the domain of solvable problems, religion offers people a framework to deal appropriately with problems for which no solution appears to exist, or at least not an immediate one. In situations of inner conflict, religion can open up perspectives of hope for solidarity. (shrink)

Chapter 1 discusses John Dewey's pragmatism and his reasons for rejecting a picture of the world which disallows human interest, striving, and concerns. Chapter 2 discusses the work of Richard Rorty's anti-foundationalism and attempts to reconstruct philosophy as hermeneutics. Chapter 3 discusses the work of Helen Longino, Lynn Hankinson Nelson, and Sandra Harding all of whom represent feminist attempts to reconstruct a concept of objectivity which is answerable to feminist concerns and which is built around an epistemolgical framework which does (...) not depend on the conception of a thing-in-itself and which emphasizes the social nature of epistemology. Longino makes clear how objects of inquiry are characterized differently in the context of different research projects. Nelson addresses the connection between moral reasoning and scientific reasoning. Harding's version of feminist standpoint theory constructs a version of 'strong objectivity'. In Chapter 4 I turn to a discussion of interpretations of Nietzsche. I argue that we need not see Nietzsche as denying truth, and I suggest the promising metaphor of omniperspectvism, found in The Genealogy of Morals, as a framework for a new concept of objectivity. Chapter 5 draws on the work of Lorraine Code to discuss how omniperspectivism and a discourse of epistemological virtue can be combined to define a better conception of objectivity than the traditional concept which emphasizes value-neutrality and disinterestedness. The major tenets of this chapter are that moral reasoning and scientific reasoning inform each other, and that these discourses interact together in the process of coming to know the world and each other; that feminist insights into the functioning of sexism and racism in scientific research, reasoning, and theory construction must be taken seriously, and that a new objectivity must allow us to evaluate and critically analyze presuppositions; that we will inevitably have problems of exclusion and disagreement, but that this need not undermine objectivity but may, in some instances, actually enhance it. (shrink)

Seit der Veröffentlichung von Bernard Williams' Aufsatz Die Sache Makropulos. Reflexionen über die Langeweile der Unsterblichkeit wird die Frage diskutiert, ob Unsterblichkeit für den Menschen wünschenswert sein kann. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz beziehe ich mich auf diese Debatte, möchte aber weniger Stellung beziehen, als vielmehr darauf hinweisen, dass eine entscheidende begriffliche Unterscheidung zwischen zwei verschiedenen möglichen Formen der Unsterblichkeit in der Diskussion bisher vernachlässigt wurde: die Unterscheidung zwischen kontingenter und notwendiger Unsterblichkeit. Während ich diese Unterscheidung im ersten Teil des Aufsatzes herausarbeite, (...) zeige ich im zweiten Teil anhand eines Arguments für den Wert der Sterblichkeit von Martha Nussbaum, welche Konsequenzen es hat, sich nicht eindeutig auf eine der beiden Formen von Unsterblichkeit festzulegen. Ihr Argument ist in der einen Lesart trivial, in der anderen falsch. Die Unterscheidung zwischen beiden Formen der Unsterblichkeit ist also von essentieller Bedeutung für die Makropulos-Debatte.Since the publication of Bernard Williams paper The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality the question is debated, whether human immortality could be desirable. In this paper I apply to this debate not so much focussing on taking a stand but on pointing out that a crucial conceptual distinction between two possible kinds of immortality has been neglected in the discussion thus far: the distinction between contingent and necessary immortality. While I point out this distinction in the first part of the paper, in the second part I proceed to show – using as an example an argument in support of the value of mortality by Martha Nussbaum – what are the consequences of not unambiguously comitting oneself to one of the two kinds of immortality. Her argument being trvial in the one, false in the other reading clearly proves that the distinction between both forms of immortality is of essential significance for the Makropulos Debate. (shrink)

When historians, archivists, and museologists turn to Eastern European photos from family albums or collections—for example, photos from the decades preceding the Holocaust and the early years of the Second World War—they seek visual evidence or illustrations of the past. But photographs may refuse to fit expected narratives and interpretations, revealing both more and less than we expect. Focusing on photos of Jews taken on the main avenues of Cerna˘u?i, Romania, before the Second World War and during the city’s occupation (...) by Fascist Romanians and their Nazi-German allies, this essay shows how a close reading of these vernacular images, both for what they show and what they are unable to show, can challenge the “before, during, and after” timeline that, in Holocaust historiography, we have come to accept as a given. (shrink)

In set theory without the Axiom of Choice, we consider Ingleton’s axiom which is the ultrametric counterpart of the Hahn–Banach axiom. We show that in ZFA, i.e., in the set theory without the Axiom of Choice weakened to allow “atoms,” Ingleton’s axiom does not imply the Axiom of Choice. We also prove that in ZFA, the “multiple choice” axiom implies the Krein–Milman axiom. We deduce that, in ZFA, the conjunction of the Hahn–Banach, Ingleton and Krein–Milman axioms does not imply the (...) Axiom of Choice. (shrink)

Even though most people nowadays endorse to the necessity and importance of interreligious dialogue, opinions differ concerning the precise interpretation of the dialogic event. The most fundamental issue remains the dialogical tension between identity and alterity. How can we combine the engagement of religious faith with the openness to the other? At first sight, the pluralistic theology offers the most acceptable answer to this question. Pluralists are convinced that the success of the interreligious dialogue depends on the readiness of the (...) religious traditions and their adherents to abandon all absolute truth claims. However, the pluralistic project is criticized heavily due to a lack of consideration for the particularity of the religious identity. Many believers do not recognize themselves in the pluralistic interpretation of their religion. In the following article I will first explain the basic principle of the pluralistic epistemology, next I will establish the pluralistic contribution to the interreligious dialogue. In third instance, I will formulate some specific Christian critics to the pluralistic project, which can be traced back to a lack of insight in the particularity of the religious identity. In fourth instance I will try to elucidate this assessment by clarifying some aspects of religious identity. I conclude with the position that, if interreligious dialogue wants to be an event between believers of different religious traditions and not in the first place between academics, it should abandon the pluralistic discourse and accept the truly irrevocable religious diversity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTRicoeur’s proposal to understand the encounter between religions as a practice of ‘linguistic hospitality’ has appealed to many interreligious scholars. Usually, religious texts are at the heart of interreligious hermeneutics, turning Ricoeur’s linguistic hospitality into a practice of interreligious cross-reading. Recently, due to the influence of material and ritual scholars, the textual focus of interreligious hermeneutics has been criticized. Two criticisms are prominent. First, the assumption that understanding religious otherness is best mediated via language and texts leads religious scholars to (...) minimize the ‘non-textual’ practices in religious life. Second, interreligious interpreters mistakenly assume that they can read all meaningful action and ritual performances, especially as texts. This assumption leads to a textualization of the world and does not take into account that there might be other ‘vehicles of intelligibility’ apart from texts. In this article, I explore to what extent the criticisms raised against Ricoeur’s interreligious hermeneutics are fair. I have learned from Ricoeur the importance of mediating between seemingly opposed positions, and I seek to follow his example in this article. (shrink)

SUMMARYCultural and religious differences often lead to conflicts, which sometimes even degenerate into violence. This situation has triggered a debate among universalists and particularists on the possibility of a global ethic. This article does not repeat the discussion here between universalism and particularism as such. Rather, its aim is to shed new light on this discussion by turning to the French philosopher Paul Ricœur, one of the great minds of the twentieth century.My starting point is Ricœur's discussion with Hans Küng (...) on the ‘Declaration Towards a Global Ethic’. This discussion is not very well known and has, to my knowledge, not been commented upon by a third party. In this discussion Ricœur immediately signals his “inner resistance” to Küng's project. First, Ricœur states that the global ethic amounts to a “disembodied formalism” because it is founded on too radical a distinction between universal formal norms and particular religious convictions. Moreover, Küngs global ethic also neglects the challenge posed by the application of these formal principles to the ethical complexities with which people are confronted in life. After having explored these objections, I will examine how Ricœur develops an original perspective concerning the contemporary challenge of ethical diversity and the tension between particularity and universality. In this regard, especially his so-called little ethics deserves our attention.In unpacking and analyzing Ricœur's ethical reflections and elaborating on them in view of the context of diversity, I hope not only to argue how this Ricœurian perspective sheds new light on the discussion concerning the possibility of a global ethic but also to contribute in a very specific way to Ricœur studies. In this sense, the following article can also be read as an intercultural or interreligious appropriation of Ricœur's ethical reflections. (shrink)

Active pluralism, an idea advanced by Steve Stevaert, former leader of the Flemish Socialist political party, has been commonly accepted among most progressive citizens. It is now a political, social and pedagogical ‘hot’ topic. Anyone wishing to be perceived as ‘open’ pleads earnestly for interreligious dialogue. Instead of passive tolerance, which too often leads to indifference, the other should now be entitled to our active concern. What is more, it benefits society as a whole. Congenial as this is, the plea (...) for active pluralism remains rather vague. This vagueness has the advantage that everyone can embrace active pluralism and be a winner. However, if active pluralism is to be more than just the latest novelty it will require conceptual clarity. Only then can it be assessed on whether it succeeds in offering a better alternative to passive pluralism. In this article I reflect on the Flemish discussion on active pluralism and intend to articulate the philosophical, anthropological and hermeneutical presuppositions underlying the concept. To do so, I take as my starting point the recent publication by the philosopher Guido Vanheeswijck, Tolerantie en actief pluralisme. De afgewezen erfenis van Erasmus, More en Gillis. (shrink)

The pluralist hypothesis as popularised by John Hick, which postulates the rough equality of religious traditions, has gained wide approval especially within interreligious circles. Nonetheless, Hick remains one of the most contested philosophers of religion of the twentieth century. Most notably, theologians have been highly critical; their polemical reactions to his pluralist hypothesis reveal their irritation. The question is: from where does this irritation arise? Why are these theologians so offended by a philosopher? How are we to understand the polemics (...) that have arisen in response to Hick’s pluralism? In this article I suggest that the controversy surrounding Hick’s pluralist hypothesis relates to the way he develops his philosophical reflections in a theological direction. There is something wrong with the way he divides the roles between philosophy and theology. I regard the discussion, which emerged from Hicks philosophy of religion as a prototype for a reflection on the complex relation between both disciplines. (shrink)

This essay explores Augustine philosophical conception of miracles in the context of a longstanding debate on the status of miracles expressed primarily in the De Genesi ad Litteram and De Trinitate. Over a half century ago P. D. Vooght remarked that Augustine “had opened up some profound and subtle views on the problem of miracles.” Dissatisfied with De Vooght’s conclusions, John Mourant and Leopold Tanganagba subsequently offered interpretations of their own on Augustine’s conception of miracles. Because Augustine’s conception of miracles (...) is complex, unsystematic, and open to further consideration, it deserves additional scrutiny as no satisfactory answer has yet been found. I begin the essay by briefly examining the significance of Augustine’s definition of a miracle in De utiltate credendi. This definition functions as a starting point for an exploration of the doctrine of seminal reasons and its relation to divine and natural causality. The difficulty of understanding Augustine’s philosophy of miracles against this background calis to mind four possible interpretations of miracles found in De Vooght’s article. These interpretations in turn provide the focal point for providing a new assessment of Augustine’s philosophy of miracles in the final section of the essay. (shrink)

While recent studies have illuminated the social and cultural realities underlying the cult of the saints in late antiquity, this communication focuses on Augustine’s beliefs regarding the metaphysical status of the saints’ humanity after death and the interaction between the saints and temporal human beings. Augustine’s representation of the lives of the saints in works such as his Sermons on the saints, On the care of the dead, the City of God, and On the predestination of the saints and On (...) perseverance at the end of his life reveals the dichotomies in his thinking on the saints with which both he and his reader must contend. The most striking dichotomies are those between popular, or lay, Christianity, and the intellectualized Christianity of a bishop like Augustine; the different historical periods to which Augustine’s works refer, namely, the persecution of the martyr-saints in the third century and faithful Christians in the fourth and fifth centuries; and the different metaphysical and spiritual frameworks of the here and now and the life to come. Against the background of these dichotomies that surface in Augustine’s writings on the saints, I explore the coherence of Augustine’s doctrine of the saints with respect to the following three concerns: a consideration of who the saints are, and what their status is after death, the relevance of the interaction between the saints and temporal human beings for living a good life now in preparation for death, and the effect that the doctrines of predestination and election have on Augustine’s determination of what can be known with respect to who is and is not saved among the saints. (shrink)

In this article I consider and reflect upon the aesthetic significance of Simon Hailwood's conception of nature as articulated in an earlier volume of this journal in his paper 'The Value of Nature's Otherness' (Environmental Values 9.3: 353-72). I provide a brief elucidation of Hailwood's conception of nature as other and I maintain that recognition of the value of nature's otherness and respect for nature's otherness requires as a necessary condition that one know and perceive that nature is other. I (...) then go on to consider Hailwood's concerns over the possibility of locating nature's value as other in aesthetic responses to nature. I argue that such reservations are warranted insofar as they focus on an inadequate 'subjectivist' account of aesthetic experience but are not warranted for all accounts of aesthetic experience, in particular, I will argue that such reservations do not apply to the 'cognitive' model of aesthetic appreciation proposed by Allen Carlson as the 'environmental model' and developed in the work of Yuriko Saito. I conclude this paper by claiming that aesthetic value is a necessary component of otherness as a ground of nature's value and that this needs to be conceded if we are to be able to acknowledge the reality of something other than ourselves, to treat it appropriately and with respect. (shrink)

Recent studies have shown that the basic evaluative conditioning (EC) effect (originally neutral stimuli acquiring an affective value congruent with the valence of the affective stimulus they were paired with) seems to be limited to participants who are unaware of the stimulus pairings. If participants are aware of the pairings, reactance effects occur (i.e., changes in the opposite direction of the valence of the affective stimulus). To examine whether these reactance effects are due to processes of conscious countercontrol or whether (...) the ratings reflect intrinsic feelings towards the stimuli, a new procedure was developed that included a bogus‐pipeline condition. In this procedure, which was adapted from attitude research, participants were connected to bogus lie detector equipment leading them to believe that their “true” affective‐evaluative responses were being observed. In Experiment 1, reactance effects occurred also in this procedure, suggesting that the effect is spontaneous and not due to processes of conscious countercontrol. In Experiment 2, these effects were replicated using a between‐subjects design in addition to the standard within‐subjects control condition. (shrink)

A central aim of Construction Grammar is to model links within the construct-i-con. This paper investigates three constructions that share one property: an atypical element in the object slot. The constructions are therefore not prototypically transitive. Structural priming (implemented with an automatic maze variant of self-paced reading) is used to test hypotheses on the relation among the Reaction Objoid (She smiled her thanks), the Cognate Objoid (She smiled a sweet smile or He told a sly tale), and the Superlative Objoid (...) (She smiled her sweetest) Construction, and between two variants of the latter (They worked (at) their hardest). Results support transitivity as gradient: intransitive COCs prime the ROC and the SOC, whereas COCs with transitives only prime the ROC. For variants of the SOC, we find evidence of asymmetric priming with the bare SOC priming the at-SOC. Within-construction priming effects in the SOC are of greater magnitude than those with the at-SOC and the latter are weaker than those of the COC and of a rather different nature than those from the ROC. This suggests that speakers, rather than creating a constructeme between the bare and the at-SOC, store distinct but closely related constructions on a cline of transitivity. (shrink)

Family research has mostly concentrated on relationships between parents and children or between women and men. On the other hand, feminist studies have explained problems within woman-to-woman relationships deriving from patriarchy. This article focuses on problematic adult woman-to-woman family relationships. More specifically, it discusses two women's ambivalent emotions narrated and experienced in their problematic female family relationships. The authors suggest that feminist studies should take into account culturally dominant narratives interlinking female subjectivity and responsibility over the private sphere. Ambivalence arises (...) in situations where individuals encounter contradictorily structured power hierarchies, i.e. simultaneously trying to follow the rules of kinship order and the desire for agency. (shrink)

This paper explores the significance of spiritual genealogy as a historiographical device in Franciscan representations of the order's past during the medieval and early modern period. Certain visual exponents of this heuristic – murals, engravings, and manuscript paintings of Franciscan family trees – have been the subject of increasing scholarly attention. I argue that these visual family trees are only one manifestation of a broader tendency to represent and analyse Franciscan order history in genealogical terms. Other manifestations include written historiography, (...) as well as genealogical images other than trees. The versatility of these visual and verbal genealogical representations of the Franciscan past made... (shrink)

Ethical issues in the care of elderly people have been identified in many countries. We report the findings of a comparative research project funded by the European Commission, which took place between 1998 and 2001. The project explored the issues of autonomy (part I), privacy (part II) and informed consent (part III) in nursing practice. Data were collected from elderly residents/patients (n = 573) and nursing staff (n = 887) in five European countries: Finland, Spain, Greece, Germany and the UK (...) (Scotland). Questionnaires were used as the data collection tool (self-completion questionnaires for staff, structured interviews for the elderly participants). Four basic nursing interventions in the care of elderly people were targeted: hygiene, fluid intake and nutrition, medication, and elimination. The data were analysed statistically. The results indicated differences within all five countries between staff and patient perceptions of autonomy, privacy and informed consent. There were also similar differences between individual countries. Conclusions were reached concerning practice, education and research. This is the first of a set of five articles published together in this issue of Nursing Ethics in which the results of this comparative research project are presented. (shrink)